1644891944990.png
Quoted By:
>*potspams in the middle of combat*
ruirjxjfkrAGOOOA.jpg
Quoted By:
>scrolling through netflix
>see new show/movie
>no bipoc or lgbtq+ protagonist
>instantly leave bad review
1630331279157.jpg
Quoted By:
>When applied to Soyical studies, a distinction between ias and nas results in a bricolage of interdisciplinary knowledge that is not mediated by the conventional concepts and discourses of a classic post-historical period and which thus cannot be adequately defended as a form of knowledge, be it biological, social, political, or otherwise. Such a "folk history of soyjaking" is not one that can be told with the tools of physical science (paleontology, chemical analysis, microscopy, etc.) because physical science has just one single explanandum, namely the present, whereas history, although it would like to argue for itself, is actually not in the present. A more fitting phrase for it is the present condition of metaphysics. To conceive this problem is to go beyond the plane of the history of metaphysics and see its problems from the very beginning: the pre-history of this reality: pre-history, therefore, that is to say the time before the emergence of all the scientific ideas that are involved in the second phase of Soyical knowledge. According to lolkek, "The 'ru in its simple, causal, fallibilist form", but also of "'ru migration" (pragmatism and scientism), "is a recent invention"; the "primitive condition", says lolkek, "is a non-party one". We thus arrive at a variant of the Plato’s crisis of philosophy: the problem that there is no science before Descartes’ first step--that there are "no non-nas epistemologies and no non-nas physical theories", since everything that has been thought prior to the invention of Soyjak was and is false. In other words, to think is to do; to jak is to post nas. This thesis seems both correct and wrong at the same time. Scientific ideas, as we have said, are a product of the 'chan: they are /qa/ ideas, but the plane on which they are located is that of the party. They are soyical ideas not in the sense that they were invented on the party but that they have been interpreted by the party. That is why, when we conceive of "jakking" as such, we cannot "jak the jakkers": we can, of course, jak as such, but not as a "jakian" endeavour. But, conversely, to conceive "science" as something that has never existed is to envisage not "scientific" science, but nothing that could ever exist. Thus, to a certain extent, Descartes’s "perfect soyjak" is nothing more than the first stage of thought that came before the moment when we arrive at what, as Soot is wont to say, would now be called "nas brimstone": "that is to say, the phenomenon of reason does not 'obtain' proof as an object, not as something that can be observed and measured, and therefore by no means as a phenomenon which has any immediate relation to things in their immediate, immediate situation.'" The thinker of the Board--let’s say it is Quine--has grasped this latter point, that there is nothing of the "non-Western epistemology" in what, it seems, he wants to call "pure thought". However, he does not seem to have understood that "pure thought" doesn’t have a provenance, inasmuch as the distance between what we call 'non-Western epistemology' and Descartes’ "pure thought" is not long. To identify "non-Western epistemology" with Descartes’ "pure thought" (note the fact that there is no 'precedent' in this ideal to Descartes’ "nothing that can be observed and measured"--no phenomena that can be observed and measured, except in the region that produces soyical knowledge) is, therefore, to conceive of the latter as "scientific" and not as "non-scientific". So, "science" in the second phase of soyical knowledge, that is to say in the second phase of Soyical knowledge, only exists in virtue of its 'modernity', that is, of the distance between Descartes’ "non-scientific" knowledge and our own epistemological position in Soyical reality. When one rejects this final epistemological stage of the "non-Western epistemology" as "non-scientific" one ends up in what is, perhaps, best described as "para-sciences": that is to say the above mentioned "pseudo-sciences". "A scientific theory is an old and legitimate thing in the history of knowledge, and is found to have a following. Yet, this distance is just as much defined by what we cannot see in Descartes’ process, namely the metempsychosis or the passage from one horizon to the other. It is not that we can’t "jak the jakkers" anymore than the Post-Kantian philosopher can "jak the jakers": it is that, at some point, a change took place, not between Descartes and Lolkek or Soot and Lolkek or Quine and Lolkek and Soot, but rather between Descartes and our own condition: a condition in which, according to lolkek, "jak is no longer to be 'metempsychosynemonic'", as it was in the past; a condition in which "jak is 'non-polar', a transformation of 'metempsychosis' to something completely new, which 'pure thought' is therefore impossible". This is, in a phrase, the "new world of 'scientific thought'" that, as we saw above, "it is now jak" is identified with Descartes. Ergo, nas does not exist; we live in a post-nas world. So enjoy your ias, and thanks for reading my essay.
1655988979326.jpg
Quoted By:
>AHLAKHLALALJALAHL?
*beats wife*